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 TRUST AND PRIVACY PERMISSIONS FOR AN AMBIENT WORLD 
 
Ambient Intelligence (AmI) and ubiquitous computing allow us to 
consider a future where computation is embedded into our daily social 
lives. This vision raises its own important questions and augments the 
need to understand how people will trust such systems and at the same 
time achieve and maintain privacy. As a result, we have recently 
conducted a wide reaching study of people’s attitudes to potential AmI 
scenarios with a view to eliciting their privacy concerns. This chapter 
describes recent research related to privacy and trust with regard to 




Ambient Intelligence (AmI) and ubiquitous computing allow us to consider a future 
where computation is embedded into our daily social lives. This vision raises its own 
important questions (cf Bohn et., 2005). Our own interest in trust and privacy predates 
this impending vision, but nonetheless holds a great deal of relevance there. As a result, 
we have recently conducted a wide reaching study of people’s attitudes to potential AmI 
scenarios with a view to eliciting their concerns and ideas. This chapter documents the 
results of this study, and contextualises them through:  
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• Considering the concept of AmI and ambient technology, and the social 
implications of AmI use.  
• Exploring relevant existing work in trust and privacy and discuss this in relation 
to ambient devices.  
• Presenting and discussing general user concerns and highlighting problems of 
exclusion.  
 
When trying to understand how trust and privacy issues are implicated in an ambient 
world focusing on purely technical approaches is not sufficient. In the e-commerce 
literature trust is well documented, traditionally emphasising the need to develop systems 
that appear trustworthy (e.g. Shneiderman, 2000).  Bødker (2004) argues ‘technical 
approaches seem to relate trust directly to the construction of secure systems, thereby 
implying that users are purely rational, economical actors.’ In an ambient world e-
services will be accessible anywhere, anytime.  Therefore this chapter considers the 
social nature of trust and privacy with regard to ambient technology (see Egger 2003 for 
a review of trust in e-commerce).  
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we comprehensively discuss the 
concept of privacy and its meaning in both physical and virtual worlds. Following this, 
we discuss the phenomenon of trust and how, in the AmI future, trust will remain a 
cornerstone of social interaction. The results, and implications for AmI, of our study are 
presented in section 3. We conclude with a discussion about what privacy and trust 
considerations might mean in the light of these results, and a preliminary set of guidelines 
for the design of AmI devices and technology that take these implications into account. 
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 The concept of Ambient Intelligence  
Ambient Intelligence (AmI) refers to the convergence of ubiquitous computing, 
ubiquitous communication, and interfaces that are both socially aware and capable of 
adapting to the needs and preferences of the user. AmI evokes, or perhaps presages, a 
near future in which humans will be surrounded by ‘always-on’, unobtrusive, 
interconnected intelligent objects, few of which will bear any resemblance to the 
computing devices of today. Mark Weiser (1991) envisaged a world where computers 
would be implanted in nearly every artefact imaginable. A person might interact with 
hundreds of computers at anyone point in time, each device invisibly embedded in the 
environment and wirelessly communicating with each other. These embedded devices 
will communicate seamlessly about any number of different topics, e.g., your present 
state of health, when you last ate, and what it was you ate. Interactions with other 
devices, and at the same time other people, will become anywhere, anytime.  
The majority of current work on AmI is driven by technological considerations, despite 
claims that it is fundamentally a human-centred development that will essentially set 
people free from the desktop; hence Punie (2003) has argued the societal and user 
implications of AmI should be made more explicit. One of the particular challenges of 
AmI is that the user will be involved in huge numbers of moment-to-moment exchanges 
of personal data without explicitly sanctioning each transaction. In the present we already 
carry around devices (mobile phones, personal digital assistants) that exchange personal 
information with other devices – but we initiate most exchanges ourselves. Nijholt et al 
(2004) argue research tends to focus on the interaction with the device or environment, 
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and not with other people or how the user is willing, able or wants to communicate with 
the environment or have the environment communicate with them.  
As humans are inherently social beings, and our actions are always directly or indirectly 
linked to other people, how will AmI technologies impact upon our social world? 
Questions naturally arise:  Will people begin to rely to heavily on AmI technology? Will 
people be comfortable exchanging all types of information, even when it is of a very 
personal nature? Will the way we socially interact change, and social norms along with 
it? Will society become one where people feel more at home interacting with their fridge 
instead of other people? Will AmI technology blur the boundaries between home and 
workplace boundaries, making a society where efficiency and productivity take 
precedence over love and leisure time?  
The seamless exchange of information has vast social implications. Two important 
factors that will influence ambient technology adoption and use are trust and privacy 
issues. Streitz & Nixon (2005) argue ‘areas of security, privacy, and trust are critical 
components for the next stages of research and deployment of ubiquitous systems. 
Moreover, it was identified that these observations are not merely an amplification of the 
current concerns of Internet users with desktop computers. New approaches are required 
that take even more into account regarding both the social and technical aspects of this 
problem to ultimately determine the acceptance of this technology by the general public’ 
(p.35).  
This chapter will focus on the social implications of information exchange in an ambient 
society and not the technical limitations or constraints of such systems. If we consider 
that the exchange of information is what makes AmI tick, we need to ask questions about 
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information that will have a direct impact on both trust and privacy, including: Who is 
receiving it? Who has access? Is the receiver credible, predictable and sensitive? Where 
is the information being sent and received? In what context is the device used? Does the 
user have choice and control? How does the device know whom to communicate with 
e.g. through-personalised agents?  




Every major advance in information and communication technologies since the late 19th 
century has increased concern about individual privacy (e.g. Brandies & Warren,1890; 
Price et al 2005). Privacy remains a hot topic, widely discussed by academics and 
practitioners alike (Kozlov, 2004). AmI brings new and increased risks, including fraud 
and identity theft, and therefore we see privacy control as essential in AmI. 
There is no universal definition of privacy, the concept is highly complex and involves 
different perspectives and dimensions. The need and desire for privacy varies between 
individuals, cultures, social and physical environmental factors (Kaya & Weber, 2003). 
The desired level of privacy relates to what an individual wants and the achieved level is 
what they actually obtain.  
Research into privacy tends to take an individualist approach and uses North American or 
Northern European perspectives (e.g. Margulis, 2003; Boni & Prigmore, 2002). 
Generally models emphasise the individual’s control and choice, and social relationships 
as either voluntary or as barriers to independence (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus & Nisbett, 
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1998). In the western world privacy definitions tend to involve management of personal 
information and space. According to Chan (2000) the ability to manipulate space is the 
primary way individuals achieve privacy. Several concepts have been linked to privacy, 
e.g., self-disclosure, social comparison, social facilitation, and social influence, attitude 
formation and change (Margulis, 2003). 
In the psychological literature, privacy is classified as a human boundary control process 
that allows access by others according to one’s own needs and situational factors (Westin, 
1967). However, this definition is not sufficient when considering information exchange 
in an AmI world. We need to understand how privacy is achieved and maintained in both 
physical and virtual worlds.  
 
Privacy in the virtual world 
The majority of the Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) literature on privacy tends to 
focus on exchange and control of information over the Internet (e.g. Jackson et., 2003; 
Cranor, Reagle & Ackerman, 1999). The actual term ‘privacy’ is generally used by 
computer scientists and security specialists to refer to the security of data against various 
risks or during transmission (Clarke, 1999).  Control of personal information is very 
important no matter where or what type of device is used. Individuals have a right to 
control and protect their personal information (Nguyen & Truong, 2003).  
Future systems will enable more freedom and reduce the physical constraints of time and 
place. According to Lester (2001) development in technology is considered to be the 
main culprit responsible for increasing concern over the protection of privacy. As new 
forms of technology are introduced, personal information may be accessed using a 
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variety of different systems. Whichever type of system people use to access personal 
information the concept of privacy is of crucial concern in both the virtual and physical 
worlds. 
However, not everyone shares the same concern, some designers and researchers appear 
to ignore the importance of privacy and the net effect it has on system use. Kozlov (2004) 
describes one such debate:  
‘…privacy design is not yet seen as a necessary requirement of an AmI design process in 
general, and that designers do not feel ‘morally responsible’ to deliver ‘privacy 
management tools’ (as stated in Kozlov, 2004, pp6). 
We need to differentiate between the physical and virtual world to understand privacy 
implications. In the physical world we rely on various cues and signals that can be either 
physical e.g. architecture or conceptual e.g. perception of space. Through past experience 
we are familiar with most contexts and environments; therefore as humans we generally 
comply and perform behaviours in an accepted way. Physical environments are often 
designed to afford privacy i.e. we can close a door or find a quiet space to talk to friends. 
The physical world compared to the virtual world is tangible i.e. we experience the 
physical world through several dimensions. In the virtual world conceptual cues are often 
missing or when present e.g. a brand name on the Internet, the actual site might be 
fraudulent. When exchanging information in the physical world we generally know who 
will have access compared to the virtual world. 
In an ambient world information collection, processing and sharing are fundamental 
procedures needed for the systems to be fully aware of the user’s needs and desires 
(Dritas et., 2005). AmI technologies will act on the user’s behalf without their explicit 
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knowledge and the interaction will be invisible. By its very nature this puts ambient 
technology and privacy in conflict. We need to understand this conflict and how privacy 
impacts upon AmI technology adoption and use.  
We already know that perceptions of privacy impact upon current technology use (e.g. 
Little, Briggs & Coventry, 2005).  For example, it is well documented that Internet users 
have major concerns regarding threat to their privacy and about who has access to the 
information they provide (Jackson et a, 2003). Cranor, Reagle & Ackerman (1999) found 
87% of users were concerned about the threat to their privacy when online. Also Cranor 
et al (1999) found Internet users were less willing to use sites that asked for personally 
identifiable information and very uncomfortable providing sensitive information such as 
credit card details. This further emphasises the need to understand privacy in an AmI 
society. 
Moor (1997) developed a Restricted Access Theory to understand intrusion, interference 
and in particular informational privacy. He suggests an individual has privacy in a 
situation with regard to others ‘if and only if the individual is protected from intrusion, 
interference and information access by others’. Moor gives a vague description of what a 
‘situation’ is or could be. He posits situations can mean activity, relationship or location. 
Moor also distinguished between naturally private situations (e.g. privacy is protected by 
the design of the environment) and normatively private situations (e.g. privacy is 
protected by laws). This approach helps differentiate between having privacy (natural) 
and having the right to privacy (normative). Although Moor argued privacy can be lost 
but not violated or invaded in natural situations because there are no norms (e.g. 
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conventional), this does not explain the dynamic nature of how people achieve and 
maintain privacy in different situations.  
Individuals do not always have absolute control about every piece of information about 
them and once information is disclosed privacy is lost. However, individuals will disclose 
information as long as they perceive the benefit will exceed the risk (Thibaut & Kelly, 
1959). Bies (2001) identified privacy as a major concern associated with unwarranted 
disclosure of information. Even when information disclosure is authorised, individuals 
are concerned with whom the information is disclosed to and the nature of the 
information disclosed. For example, Cranor, Reagle & Ackerman (1999) suggest that if 
the information is disclosed through cookies or disclosure is made to a specific party (e.g. 
Social Security number) and was not authorised, concern over privacy is more salient. 
Fears related to online privacy stem from the technologies’ ability to monitor and record 
every aspect of the user’s behaviour (Metzger, 2004). Many users are aware that their 
privacy is at risk when using the Internet and their online tour can be tracked. Users are 
aware after visiting some sites cookies can get implanted onto their hard drives and they 
then become a target for unsolicited mail. Users leave data trails almost everyday, e.g. 
credit card use. An individual’s data can be collected from the trail he or she leaves 
behind and few legal restrictions exist on how the data can be used (McCandlish, 2002). 
The value of such information increases as more data is collected. At one time the 
collection of an individual’s personal information was limited to: age, address, credit 
history (personal identity and life history). Now with technologies such as the Internet 
and surveillance other data can be collected about a person’s behaviour and life: 
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movement, buying history, association with other people and unauthorised access to 
electronic records (Arndt, 2005). 
Although several programs exist to stop personal details being collected, individuals may 
not know how to install or use them. Privacy preference protocols and systems such as 
Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) (Cranor, 2002). Allow users to set 
preferences in accordance with their privacy needs. When online users are informed that 
their preferences do not match the privacy policies of each site visited, they can therefore 
decide whether or not to continue the interaction. However, we must question whether 
this concept would truly work in an AmI society. Palen & Dourish (2003) argue that as 
our lives are not predictable, and privacy management is a dynamic response to both the 
situation and circumstance, prior configuration and static rules will not work. Therefore, 
disclosure of information needs to be controlled dynamically. Olsen et al (2005) take an 
opposite view and suggest individuals can set preferences for sharing information as 
people tend to have clusters of similar others and therefore the task is not as complex or 
particularly difficult to undertake as it first may seem. 
When interacting with technology privacy protection and disclosure of information is a 
two-way process. From the technological view point, e.g. use of the Internet, the Fair 
Information Practice-FIP (e.g. Federal Trade Commission of America, 2000) suggest 
companies should give users: notice, choice, access and security. Notice refers to the 
right of the individual to know what information is being collected and how it will be 
used. Choice means individuals have the right to object when personal information is 
collected for another purpose than the one described or shared with third parties. Access 
refers to the individual’s right to see the information and correct errors. Security means 
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companies will honour and ensure data integrity and that data is secure from unauthorised 
access during both transmission and storage. Practices such as FIP are needed to mediate 
privacy, empower the individual, increase the users control and create assurance. These 
policies also reduce data-gathering, data-exchanging and data-mining and therefore are 
important in an ambient society. 
Academics, researchers and industry acknowledge that AmI technologies introduce a new 
privacy risk (e.g., Price et., 2005). Privacy control in an AmI world is essential to 
decrease risks such as fraud and identity theft. Consider the following question: Will 
users be able to set their own privacy preferences? The answer seems easy, but is it? 
Humans live, work and interact with a variety of people and in different environments. 
The multifaceted nature of human-human interaction requires each individual to set 
complex sets of privacy preferences dependent upon their situation and circumstance. 
These preferences would also have to remain stable across place, space, country and 
culture.  
If AmI technologies are used globally, systems must be designed so that user privacy 
settings remain secure and unchanged across international boundaries. For example, 
Europe has a tighter data protection act compared to the USA (Dawson et., 2003). 
Therefore someone travelling from Europe to the USA might find unknown others have 
access to his or her personal information when entering the country due to the slacker 
regulation and control of privacy policies related to AmI systems.  
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Privacy in the physical world 
In the future individuals will be able to use systems in a multitude of different social 
environments and be interacting with a variety of people, such as friends, family or 
complete strangers. 
 Concerns already exist about certain technologies used in public places. One such system 
found in nearly all cities is the surveillance camera. Clark (1999) termed the phrase 
‘dataveillance’ to capture the techniques of surveillance and data recording. People have 
been ‘watched’ and their behaviour recorded in public places for many years. Many 
arguments exist for the use of such cameras, e.g. crime reduction. However as advances 
in surveillance technologies are made many now argue that privacy no longer exists, or 
that if it does it is quickly disappearing as our activities are increasingly made public 
(Gotlieb, 1996; Brin, 1998). 
Another area of growing concern for users of technology in public places that violates 
their privacy is tracking. Users of mobile telephones are already aware their service 
provider can track their location. However design specifications in future technologies 
may mean it is not only the service provider who knows where you are and what you are 
doing. The future could see systems developed that track users to specific locations 
whether their device is switched on or off. Tracking will not only be available to the 
service provider but to virtually anyone who wants to know where the user is. Although 
this may be a good idea, for example in the case of missing persons, it does raise 
important ethical issues. 
A recent study by Consolvo et al (2005) found individuals are willing to disclose 
something about their location most of the time. However, the individual will only 
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disclose information when:  the information is useful to the person requesting it, the 
request is timely, is dependent upon the relationship he or she has with the requestor and 
why the requestor needs the information. These findings highlight the need for control 
and choice over disclosure of personal information at any one point in time. 
 
Western models of privacy 
Perception of privacy in the western world often differs from eastern cultures. For 
example, space in the west is generally considered a mechanism to achieve and maintain 
privacy but not as important in eastern cultures. This research employs western 
approaches to understand and describe privacy.  Two western models that have been very 
influential in privacy research in the discipline of psychology are those developed by 
Altman in 1975 and Westin in 1967. Both theories are examples of a limited-access 
approach to privacy (Margulis, 2003). The theories both describe privacy in terms of 
needs and desires that are: control and regulation of access to oneself and a continuous 
dynamic regulation process that changes due to internal/external conditions. Both 
theories acknowledge regulation can sometimes be unsuccessful, different types of 
privacy exist and privacy is culturally specific. 
Altman (1975) described privacy as an ideal, desired state or as an achieved end state. If 
the desired state matches the achieved state then an optimal level of privacy is obtained. 
Privacy is obtained by selective control of access to the self. Altman suggested that social 
interaction is at the heart of understanding privacy and that the environment provides 
mechanisms for regulation. Altman proposed four mechanisms to achieve privacy: verbal 
(e.g. what is said, tone of voice), non-verbal behaviour (e.g., eye contact in 
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communicating attitudes or intentions), environmental (e.g., personal space, physical 
aspects of the environment) and culture (e.g., norms, beliefs). 
Westin (1967) suggested individuals use a limited-access approach to protect their 
privacy. He defined privacy as a dynamic process of regulation that is non-monotonic, 
i.e. an individual can have too much or too little. Westin proposed four types of privacy: 
solitude (being free from observation by others), intimacy (small group seclusion), 
anonymity (freedom from surveillance in public places) and reserve (limited disclosure of 
information to others). The four types serve various functions: personal autonomy (desire 
to avoid manipulation), emotional release (ability to release tensions from the social 
world), self-evaluation (ability to contemplate, reflect), limit (set boundaries) and protect 
communication (share information with trusted others). Westin’s model has been 
extended several times to include other dimensions (e.g., seclusion, not neighbouring 
Marshall, 1970). Previous research that highlights the importance of additional 
dimensions shows how aspects of privacy can be context-specific.   
Pedersen (1999, 1997, 1979) further developed Westin’s model and categorised privacy 
into six main types: solitude (freedom from observation by others), reserve (not revealing 
personal information about one’s self to others), isolation (being geographically removed 
from and free from others observation), intimacy with family (being alone with family), 
intimacy with friends (being alone with friends) and anonymity (being seen but not 
identified or identifiable by others). Pedersen suggests that the six types of privacy 
‘represent the basic approaches people use to satisfy their privacy needs’.  
Although speculative, Burgoon (1982) suggested four dimensions of privacy: physical, 
psychological, social and informational.  The physical dimension relates to how 
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physically accessible a person is to others and can be linked to such aspects as 
environmental design. The psychological dimension refers to a person’s right to decide 
with whom they share personal information and the control of cognitive/affective 
inputs/outputs such as non-verbal communication. The social dimension is the ability to 
control social interactions by controlling distance between people. The informational 
privacy dimension relates to a person’s right to reveal personal information to others, 
which is not always under a person’s control.  
Privacy regulation 
The regulation of privacy is complicated due to the range of functions it maintains and 
protects. Levels of perceived privacy can be increased or decreased dependent upon an 
individuals experience, expectation, other people in the area, the task at hand, and the 
physical environment. Regulation is considered as a dynamic process with variable 
boundaries that are under continuous negotiation and management, continuously refined 
according to circumstance (Palen & Dourish, 2003). Generally individuals rely on 
features of their spatial world and the immediate environment. Regulation and control 
can also be sort by verbal and non-verbal behaviour.  
Levels of privacy change dynamically and are affected by both internal and/or external 
conditions. To gain the desired level of privacy a person tries to regulate their interaction 
by altering or maintaining their behaviour dependent upon the situation they find 





Problems with privacy 
Problems exist when trying to understand and investigate privacy issues that are related 
to both physical and virtual worlds. No one theory or approach is sufficient to explore 
this complex topic. 
Findings from privacy research in the Human Computer Interaction (HCI) and computer 
science areas tend to focus on security aspects of existing or hypothetical systems. 
However recent studies are now acknowledging the complex nature of human-human 
interaction and the need for users to set multiple privacy preferences in an AmI world 
(e.g., Price et., 2005). 
Privacy research has suffered from a lack of consensus regarding the different 
dimensions, functions and definitions of what ‘the environment’ actually consists of. 
Therefore we need to consider all dimensions if we are to understand how people achieve 
and maintain privacy in an AmI society. The dimensions proposed by Westin and 
Pedersen have been criticised as too confusing and overlapping (Burgoon, 1982). The 
dimensions appear to ignore physical privacy, i.e. the degree to which an individual is 
physically inaccessible. All of the proposed dimensions implicate psychological 
functioning there is no clear differentiation between other types of privacy such as 
informational. The types of privacy describe interaction with others that occurs in 
controlled situations and ignores unwanted input.  
Although Burgoon’s approach to privacy is speculative it lacks explanation of control 
over the various dimensions. For example, information pertaining to the social and 
physical aspects can be temporal i.e., an individual can choose to reveal a certain amount 
of information at any one time and control the level of interaction, for instance, they may 
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walk away. In comparison, once an individual reveals any type of information in the 
informational and psychological dimensions he or she is no longer in control of it and 
cannot take it back. 
Concerns have also been raised in privacy research due to the actual concept itself, i.e. 
individuals both protect and manage it (Pedersen, 1999). No one theory fully describes 
the objective, physical environment or how environmental concepts are associated with 
the independent psychological descriptions of privacy (Margulis, 2003). Margulis states a 
complete explanation of privacy needs is required to understand how social activity is 
situated in context where objective, physical characteristics often affect behaviour.  
Levels of control and actual context of the interaction all have a major affect on use of 
AmI technology and the user. We need to understand how people will regulate, control 
and choose when to interact with such devices and who will have access to their personal 
information.   
We know privacy is a multi-dimensional construct encompassing physical and social 
judgments (e.g. Pederson, 1999). There are four main dimensions of privacy relevant to 
AmI research: physical (in what type of environment is the system being used), 
informational (what type of information is being exchanged), psychological (is the 
information shared, and if so with whom) and social (who else is present at that time). 
Each dimension of privacy i.e. informational, psychological, physical and social needs to 
be evaluated if we are to understand fully the concept of privacy when related to AmI 
use. To fully understand privacy we need to consider: how humans interact with each 
other, how humans interact with technology, how technologies communicate with other 
technologies and know the technical constraints of each system.  
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 Trust 
There is today a diffuse agreement about the fact that one of the major problems for the 
success of computer supported society, smart physical environment, virtual reality, 
virtual organisation, computer mediated interaction, etc. is trust: people’s trust in 
potential partners, information sources, data, mediating agents, personal assistants; and 
agents’ trust in other agents and processes. Security measures are not enough, 
interactivity and knowledgability are not enough, the problem is how to build in users 
and agents trust and how to maintain it.  
(Falcone & Castelfranchi, 2001, pp55-56) 
Trust and privacy are inter-related constructs – the more we trust, the more information 
we are prepared to reveal about ourselves (Teltzrow & Kobsa, 2004).  Social 
commentators recognise that trust is essential for society (Bok, 1978; Fukuyama, 1996). 
An interesting picture is emerging about the ways in which individuals make trust 
judgments in technology-mediated interactions; however trust judgments are not always 
made on a rational basis.  As trust is multi-faceted several factors are important when 
understanding AmI use: personalisation, motivation, expertise, familiarity, predictability, 
sensitivity and the actual source of the information. 
 
Thinking about Trust 
For all the studies on the subject (see for example Luhmann, 1979, 2000; Misztal, 1996; 
Sztompka, 1999; Dibben, 2000), trust remains something of an enigma: it is hard to 
define, hard to see, and difficult to explain, but everyone (at least in certain cultures) 
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seems to know what it is (for a discussion of this, see Dibben, 2000, especially p6-7). 
While that is somewhat annoying when you’re trying to study it, it presents its own 
opportunities, and to a certain extent makes life easier when you ask people to talk about 
it, as in the sessions documented below (but it’s hard to know, after the fact, what people 
really meant).  
The enigmatic nature of trust is reinforced by the sheer volume, nowadays, of research in 
the area, and the almost pathological need of each and every article to define the 
phenomenon in some way. In social science alone, for instance ‘the […] research on trust 
has produced a good deal of conceptual confusion regarding the meaning of trust and its 
place in social life.’ (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p975). The situation is hardly made better 
by the plethora of definitions within information and communication technologies, let 
alone computer security’s somewhat muddled understanding of the term. Although 
thankfully similarities exist in most of the extant definitions, they remain different 
enough to try what is already an overloaded term. In this section we will try to pick apart 
the phenomenon with the aim of showing what the similarities are in the definitions, with 
the modest aim of arriving at something that makes sense in the context of this chapter (a 
more wide-reaching understanding will wait for a short while longer). 
In the context of AmI, trust is a particularly important phenomenon. In the first instance, 
people are going to be put into situations where they may have to trust their own devices, 
and be influenced by these same devices. To a large extent, this situation is not unlike 
what exists now. There are many studies on trust in HCI, user interfaces, eCommerce, 
and so forth, and their results widely known. For instance, in a static setting, the design of 
an interface can have dramatic effects on the perceived trustworthiness of the system (for 
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instance, Cheskin, 1999, 2000; Riegelsberger & Sasse, 2001; Egger, 2000; Fung & Lee, 
1999; Karvonen, 1999; Corritore et al. 2003). Indeed, much is also known about the 
effect on and development of trust in, for example, conversational interfaces (Bickmore 
& Cassell, 2001), digital systems in general (Corritore et., 2003), seeking on-line advice 
(Sillence et al 2004), and even to a lesser extent mobile technology (Siau & Shen, 2003). 
We find ourselves then in a situation where we are capable of at least beginning to 
understand how to build interfaces and systems that encourage and elicit trust.  
There’s more to AmI and trust than the interface, or even the system, however (for an 
excellent review of many AmI implications see Bohn et., 2005). For starters, it’s not just 
an interface to a single device we’re talking about. AmI is a whole environment, all 
around us, or invisible devices, all potentially ‘talking’ to each other, ‘behind our backs.’ 
The implications on trust, we conjecture, are extreme and somewhat pressing. For 
instance, am I placing trust in my device, or the devices it talks to, or the environment as 
a whole? When we consider that AmI is in fact nothing more than a collection of agents 
doing things for people, where then is the trust placed? In the agents, or the people, or 
both? Ultimately, AmI is about sharing information that is useful to the people in the 
environment so that they can enjoy themselves more, get more stuff, have easier lives, 
and so on. That being the case, the sharing of information and the potentials for 
transitivity in trust and privacy are amongst the more daunting challenges facing the 
vision. We think that proper models of and a deep understanding of trust, applied in all of 
these situations, can help in the design and implementation of not only secure but also 
usable and socially responsible ambient intelligence environments. 
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On a final note justifying the need for trust, consider the vision of AmI more closely. In 
its most pure form, AmI is a connected society of humans and artificial agents, from 
simple to complex, interacting as only a society can. This, if nothing else, requires us to 
encourage, build, and study trust in that society, because ultimately, a society without 
trust cannot exist (Good, 2000; Luhmann, 1979; Bok, 1978).  
 
The Generalities: Exploring Definitions of Trust 
 
• Trust is ‘the expectation that arises, within a community, of regular and honest 
cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other 
members of that community.’ (Fukuyama, 1995, p26). 
• Trust is ‘a state involving confident positive expectations about another’s motives 
with respect to oneself in situations entailing risk.’ (Boon & Holmes, 1991, p194) 
• Regardless of the underlying discipline of the authors […] confident expectations 
and a willingness to be vulnerable are critical components of all definitions of 
trust…’ (Rousseau et., 1998, p394). 
• ‘Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective 
probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents 
will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action and in a 
context in which it affects his own action.’ (Gambetta, 2000, p218). 
• ‘We define trust in the Internet store as a consumer’s willingness to rely on the 
seller and take action in circumstances where such action makes the consumer 
vulnerable to the seller.’ (Jarvenpaa et., 1999) 
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As can be seen, several accepted and acceptable definitions of trust exist – the interested 
reader is referred to (Dibben, 2000; Marsh & Dibben, 2003; Abdul-Rahman, 2004 
(chapters 2 and 3 especially); Viljanen, 2005) for more in depth discussions. However, 
some salient points are important to note.  
• The first is that trust is contextual, or situational – that is, it is based in a specific 
context and can only be generalised (to a greater or lesser extent) outside of that 
context.  
• Secondly, trust exists in situations of risk – there is some discussion as to whether 
or not that risk is high or not for trust to exist, but in general it is accepted that 
without some degree of risk, trust is unnecessary.  
• Third, there is some requirement for free will (or similar) on the part of the trustee 
– that is, that they are able to do something which is intentionally or otherwise 
detrimental to the truster, just as they are able to do what they are trusted to do.  
• Fourth (perhaps more controversially), the phenomenon of trust requires a 
consideration of alternatives – without such a consideration, with a blind ‘jumping 
into’ a given situation, the phenomenon at work is not trust, but confidence (cf. 
Luhmann, 1990). In fact, it is from ‘confidence’ that the concept of ‘blind trust’ 
grows, with the subsequent argument (see Marsh, 1994) that blind trust is in fact 
not trust at all. 
Rather than reinvent the trust wheel, we propose a definition that has worked relatively 
well for us in the past, and contains, in a succinct summary, most of the salient points of 
trust:  
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 Trust is ‘a positive expectation regarding the behaviour of somebody or something in a 
situation that entails risk to the trusting party.’ (Patrick et., 2005) 
What remains is to find out where this definition fits within AmI, what risks are involved, 
and what expectations are reasonable. 
 
The Specifics: Trust in AmI, a Discussion 
The Concept of Context 
It is generally agreed that trust is a contextual phenomenon (some say, situationally 
dependent, meaning almost the same thing). This means that the trust given or received is 
dependent of who is the truster or the trustee, the task at hand, the opportunities for 
betrayal, the potential for gain or loss, and so on. In our own context, it will also bring to 
bear what tools are being used, what information may or may not be being considered, 
and so on. It is critically important to bear in mind that the concept of AmI introduces 
artificial trustees to users. The concept of familiarity then becomes something of 
importance in trusting deliberations. According to Luhmann (1990), ‘trust has to be 
achieved within a familiar world, and changes may occur in the familiar features of the 
world which will have an impact on the possibility of developing trust in human 
relations.’ (p.94). Thus, it is difficult to trust what is unfamiliar. In the context of AmI, 
for many people, the whole edifice is unfamiliar, and so a certain lack of trust may be 
expected, until familiarity is achieved either through use or, as in this work, through 
demonstrations of how AmI can, for example, benefit the user in specific, familiar 
contexts (shopping, banking, and so on).  
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Of course, if Weiser’s (1991) original vision of ubiquitous computing (and by extension 
AmI) is to be realised, what we will see will in fact be nothing: the computers will 
become the background in which we all live (Bohn et., 2005). Therefore how do we 
conceptualise and explore familiarity and its associated problems? In this instance, does 
AmI just become another societal tool? If this is the case, what are the implications for 
trust? 
 
Can We ‘Trust’ (Artificial) Technology? 
The question of whether or not it is possible to trust technology has been raised in the 
past, with equally convincing arguments on either side. On one side (see for example 
Friedman et., 2000), the argument reads that since trust implies a freedom of action on 
the part of the trustee, it’s impossible to refer to the relationship with technology 
(software, agents, cars, etc.) as one of trust, since technology does not in fact have free 
will: ‘people trust people, not technology.’ (ibid, p36) In many cases, this is at least a 
valid argument, but within AmI, the distinction between traditional technology, as seen 
by the proponents of this argument, and the ‘free actor’ is blurred almost to non-
existence. To illustrate this argument, consider, information sharing between two agents 
in a closed network. Generally, it really doesn’t matter what they share, because no-one is 
looking at it, and nothing gets done with it. Now, embed these agents in an ambient 
environment. Suddenly everything changes, but not because the agents have any more or 
less free will. The crucial addition to this environment is that of people (who, for our 
purposes, unquestionably do have free will!). If a human is able to query the agent(s) for 
what they know, and use it (on or off line), the concept of trust is not just important, but 
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absolutely imperative. Further, the trustee is becoming something of a blurred concept – 
is it the person who gets the information, or the agent that gives it to them – in other 
words, should we not think about trusting the agent as a surrogate, to do the right thing 
with the information it may have? 
Largely, the discussion is philosophical, and somewhat moot – of course we can argue 
about whether technology can or cannot be validly trusted, but we inadvertently (or not) 
find ourselves in a situation where people are talking about trust in the environment in a 
fashion that sounds very much like trusting the technology behind that environment. 
Further, and critically, thinking in this way enables the people to more quickly assimilate 
and understand the environment. From a HCI perspective, this understanding, based on 
potentially flawed arguments though it might be, is a significant achievement (although 
we’d like to wean people off it somewhat (see below, and (Marsh, 2005)). Further, in 
terms of security and privacy, being able to think in terms of trust allows us to conceive 
much more powerful solutions to practical problems (for more discussion of which, see 
(Patrick et., 2005)). 
 
The Structure of Trust: Rules for Trust Behaviour in AmI 
For all its conceptual fuzziness, it’s possible to put forward some rules that trust appears 
to obey. It’s worth noting that these rules are still debated hotly amongst trust researchers, 
but two things apply here: first, it’s worth putting up something for discussion to take 
place around, and second, there appears, at least to these authors, to be a movement 
towards accepting that these rules are for the most part correct. The rules allow designers 
and users to be able to reason about what can happen, should happen, or is happening 
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behind the scenes; how, for example, information gets shared with some agents and not 
others, or how much information gets shared, and so on. To a large extent, defining these 
rules for trust in AmI is a step along the road towards a system that can explain itself, 
much like expert systems can explain their chains of reasoning when queried. The 
interested reader is referred to Viljanen (2005), and Marsh, (1994, esp. ch.6) for the roots 
of these observations and rules. A different slant on some of the rules (especially 
regarding transitivity, the real ‘hot’ topic) can be found in (Chang et., 2004): 
 
• Trust is not symmetric, that is, it is unidirectional: ‘John trusts Bert’ says little to 
nothing about Bert trusting John. Consider that we walk across the road every day 
‘trusting’ that people we don’t even know, and who don’t know us, will not run us 
over. Moreover, it is not necessary for Bert to actually know that he is trusted by 
John for it to be the case. 
• Trust is not distributive: as Viljanen (2005, p176) states: ‘If “Alice trusts (Bob 
and Carol),” it does not follow that “(Alice trusts Bob) and (Alice trusts Carol).”’ 
In fact, this has very far reaching implications for AmI, especially when one 
considers groups and organisations. 
• Trust is not associative: ‘“(Alice trusts Bob) trusts Carol” is not a valid trust 
expression. However, “Alice trusts (Bob trusts Carol)” is a possibility’ (ibid. 
p176). This has implications for transitivity, in fact. 
• Trust is not (strictly) transitive: In fact, it makes sense in the context of AmI to 
think of it in some way as weakly transitive, but it is not necessarily the case. It is 
not possible in any given circumstance to say, however, that if Bert trusts John 
 27
and John trusts Scott, then Bert trusts Scott. It’s a relatively easy step from some 
of the other rules (especially unidirectionality) to see that this is the case. 
However, if Bert trusts John and knows that John trusts Scott, there may be a way 
we can infer (and make rules for) Bert trusting Scott to some extent.  
 
When we are thinking about AmI and trust, a very real consideration is how one can trust 
that the information held about one is given only to those who I trust with it, only for a 
specific requirement, for only a finite length of time, and so on. The observations above 
are relevant in this context. Only when the individual agents within an AmI environment 
can reason with rules derived from these observations can we expect AmI to behave in a 
socially responsible fashion – or to put it another way, at the very least in a fashion that 
people can understand and hopefully accept. We are currently developing a system of 
measurements and rules, that we call Boing, to address this issue. 
We cannot fully understand trust without considering risk. Trust and risk are symbiotic 
concepts – where one cannot fully exist without the other. As Brien (1998) argues in the 
absence of risk trust is meaningless. Indeed some of the trust models that have been 
developed in recent years have explicitly included risk (Corritore, Kracher & 
Wiedenbeck, 2003). Sillence et al (2004) state when people seek online advice they are 
more willing to trust a site if perceived risk is low.  Most models of trust implicate 






Innovative technologies have been developed over centuries; their impact on society, 
social structure and behaviour is well documented (Kostakos et., 2005).  For example, the 
Internet has had a huge impact on how we interact socially. Even after more than thirty 
years the social implications of Internet use are still not fully understood. When we use 
the Internet we disclose information about ourselves on nearly every mouse click. The 
trail we leave behind makes it possible for anyone with the required skill to follow us. 
The majority of people believe that they can control and regulate the disclosure of their 
personal information. However, will people be able to regulate and control all 
information pertaining to them when using AmI devices? It is not only the control of 
information that increases concerns in this future world; we must acknowledge that the 
social implications of such AmI devices are vast. The presence and use of these 
technologies will be major factors influencing our lives and how we socially interact.  
As systems become more ubiquitous and free the user from time and place, research 
suggests that although anytime, anyplace may be possible it may not always be 
acceptable (Perry et al 2001). People have existing expectations about how technology 
works, and social norms provide cues on how they should interact in any given situation 
(Jessup & Robey, 2002).  
Discussed earlier was the concept of ‘tracking’. Tracking is a departure from existing 
social norms in that a person knows information about you that you are unaware of i.e. 
where you are. Generally, when we socially interact with others (e.g., through face-to-
face interaction or a telephone conversation) we reveal information about ourselves both 
verbally and non-verbally. The important point is that ‘we’ have made a decision to 
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disclose information to another person and generally we know who and where he or she 
is and vice versa. Will we need to have ‘lie nodes’ built into devices so our presence in 
every place or space we visit is not accounted for? 
We already carry around a voluntary traceable microchip embedded in our mobile 
telephone. However, will the growth in tracking devices increase and make our lives so 
predictable that we lose the inherent social process of adventure and value? The 
introduction of social positioning maps will let us ‘see before we go’ and let others ‘see 
where we are.’ Ahas & Mark (2005) acknowledge that privacy and security of social 
positioning devices are important issue but argue ‘fears people have will most likely 
diminish in future as people become accustomed to mobile positioning and begin to enjoy 
the service’. They also suggest concern over surveillance will also disappear. 
Further questions arise related to AmI: How will people manage and control the amount 
of information revealed at any point in time? Who will people feel comfortable sharing 
different types of information with? How will people set and evaluate privacy and trust 
permissions that will govern what is being shared? The AmI challenge is particularly 
pressing, since in future there will be no obvious physical markers to tell us when we 
move from private to public cyberspaces (Beslay & Punie, 2002) and so individuals must 
be given a clearer vision of how and when to control personal data.  
The aim of this research is to investigate how people will control information exchange 
when using AmI devices. To try to understand adoption and use we need to consider the 




To understand and investigate the concept of AmI technology and subsequent use key 
stakeholders provided specific scenarios illustrating the ways in which privacy, trust and 
identity information might be exchanged in the future. The stakeholders included relevant 
user groups, researchers, developers, businesses and government departments with an 
interest in AmI development. Four scenarios were developed, related to health, e-voting, 
shopping and finance that included facts about the device, context of use, type of service 
or information the system would be used for. These scenarios are briefly described 
below: 
 
Health Scenario: Bob is in his office talking on his personal digital assistant (PDA) to a 
council planning officer with regard to an important application deadline. Built into his 
PDA are several personalised agents that pass information seamlessly to respective 
recipients. A calendar agent records and alerts Bob of deadlines, meetings, lunch 
appointments and important dates. As Bob is epileptic his health agent monitors his 
health and can alert people if he needs help. An emergency management agent takes 
control in situations when a host of different information is needed; this agent has the 
most permissions and can contact anyone in Bob’s contact list.  
Bob is going to meet his friend Jim for lunch when he trips over a loose paving slab. He 
falls to the ground and looses consciousness. His health agent senses something is wrong 
and beeps, if Bob does not respond by pressing the appropriate key on the PDA the agent 
immediately informs the emergency services. Within seconds the emergency services are 
informed of Bob’s current situation and his medical history. An ambulance is on its way. 
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Paramedics arrive, examine Bob and then inform the hospital of Bob’s condition on their 
emergency device. The hospital staff are now aware of Bob’s medical history and his 
present state, therefore on arrival he is taken straight to the x-ray department. A doctor 
receives the x-rays on her PDA. After examining Bob she confirms that he has a broken 
ankle, slight concussion and needs to stay in hospital overnight. After receiving treatment 
Bob is taken to a ward. His emergency management agent contacts John (Bob’s boss) of 
his circumstance. The emergency management agent transfers the planning application 
files to John’s PDA so the company do not miss the deadline. The agent also informs his 
parents letting them know his current state of health, exactly where he is so they can visit 
and that his dog needs to be taken care of. As Bob is also head coach at a local running 
club the agent informs the secretary Bob will not be attending training the following 
week. The secretary only receives minimal information through the permissions Bob has 
set.   
 
Shopping Scenario: Anita arrives at the local supermarket grabs a trolley and slips her 
PDA into the holding device. A message appears on screen and asks her to place her 
finger in the biometric verification device attached to the supermarket trolley. Anita 
places her finger in the scanner and a personalised message appears welcoming her to 
the shop. She has used the system before and knows her personalised shopping list will 
appear next on the PDA screen. Anita’s home is networked and radio frequency 
identification tags are installed everywhere. Her fridge, waste bin and cupboards 
monitor and communicate seamlessly with her PDA creating a shopping list of items 
needed. The supermarket network is set so that alerts Anita of special offers and works 
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alongside her calendar agent to remind her of any important dates. As she wanders 
around the supermarket the screen shows her which items she needs in that particular 
aisle and their exact location. The device automatically records the price and ingredients 
of every item she puts into trolley and deletes the information if any item is removed. 
When Anita is finished she presses a button on the PDA and the total cost of her shopping 
is calculated. Anita pays for the goods by placing her finger on the biometric device and 
her account is automatically debited, no need to unpack the trolley or wait in a queue. 
The trolley is then cleared to leave the supermarket. Anita leaves the supermarket, walks 
to her car and places her shopping in the boot. 
 
E-voting Scenario: Natasha decides she wants to vote in the next election using the new 
on-line system. She goes on-line and requests electronic voting credentials. Shortly 
before polling day a polling card and separate security card are delivered to Natasha’s 
home. They arrive as two separate documents to reduce the risk of interception. Natasha 
picks up two of the letters from the doormat and puts the letters in her pocket as she 
rushes out of the door to head for work. While travelling on the local underground 
railway system Natasha decides to cast her vote on her way to work. The letters have 
provided her with a unique personal voting and candidate numbers which allows her to 
register a vote for her chosen candidate. She takes out her mobile phone and types her 
unique number into it. Her vote is cast by entering this unique number into her phone and 
sending it to a number indicated on the polling card. Her phone then shows a text 
message: THANK YOU FOR VOTING. YOU HAVE NOT BEEN CHARGED FOR THIS 
CALL. When Natasha arrives at work she logs on to the voting site to see if her vote has 
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been registered. While at her computer with her polling cards on the desk in front of her 
a colleague looks over her shoulder, she can see that Natasha is checking her vote but 
can’t see who she has voted for. Once the result of the election has been announced 
Natasha checks that the correct candidate name is published next to her unique response 
number to ensure that the system has worked properly. 
Financial Scenario: Dave is at home writing a ‘to do’ list on his PDA. The PDA is 
networked and linked to several services that Dave has authorised. While writing his list 
he receives a reminder from his bank that he needs to make an appointment with the 
manager related to his yearly financial health check. He replies and makes an 
appointment for later that day. When he arrives at the bank he is greeted by the bank 
concierge system (an avatar presented on a large interface). The system is installed in the 
foyer of the bank where most customers use the banks facilities. The avatar tells Dave the 
manager, Mr Brown, will be with him soon. The avatar notes that Dave has a photograph 
to print on his ‘to do’ list and asks if he would like to print it out at the bank as they offer 
this service. The avatar also asks Dave to confirm a couple of recent transactions on his 
account prior to meeting Mr Brown.  
 
The analysis of the shopping and health scenario will be discussed further in this chapter. 
 
Development of Videotaped Scenarios 
The elicited scenarios were scripted and the scenes were videotaped in context to develop 
Videotaped Activity Scenarios (VASc). The VASc method is an exciting new tool for 
generating richly detailed and tightly focussed group discussion and has been shown to 
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be very effective in the elicitation of social rules (Little et., 2003). VASc are developed 
from either in-depth interviews or scenarios, these are then acted out in context and 
videotaped. The VASc method allows individuals to discuss their own experiences, 
express their beliefs and expectations. This generates descriptions that are rich in detail 
and focussed on the topic of interest. For this research a media production company 
based in the UK was employed to recruit actors and videotape all scenarios. The 
production was overseen by both the producer and the research team to ensure correct 
interpretation. British Sign Language (BSL) and subtitles were also added to a master 




The VASc's were shown to thirty-eight focus groups, the number of participants in each 
group ranged from four to twelve people. The total number of participants was three-
hundred and four. Participants were drawn from all sectors of society in the Newcastle 
upon Tyne area of the UK, including representative groups from the elderly, the disabled 
and from different ethnic sectors. Prior to attending one of the group sessions participants 
were informed about the aims and objectives of the study. Demographic characteristics of 
all participants were recorded related to: age, gender, disability (if any), level of 
educational achievement, ethnicity, and technical stance. A decision was made to allocate 
participants to groups based on: age, gender, level of education and technical stance as 
this was seen as the best way possible for participants to feel at ease and increase 
discussions. As this study was related to future technology it was considered important to 
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classify participants as either technical or non-technical. This was used to investigate any 
differences that might occur due to existing knowledge of technological systems. 
Therefore participants were allocated to groups initially by technical classification i.e. 
technical/non-technical, followed by gender, then level of educational achievement (high 
= university education or above versus low = college education or below), and finally age 
(young, middle, old). Overall this categorization process culminated in 24 main groups. 
Due to poor attendance at some group sessions these were run again at a later date. 
Although several participants with physical disabilities attended the main group sessions 
two group sessions for people with visual and auditory impairments were carried out at 
the Disability Forum in Newcastle. The forum was considered to have easier access and 
dedicated facilities for people with such disabilities. 
 
Technical Classification 
To classify participants into technical or non-technical six questions based on a 
categorization process by Maguire (1998) were used. Participants answer the questions 
using a yes/no response. Responding yes to questions 1, 3, 5 and 6, no to questions 2 and 
4 would give a high technical score of 6. If the opposite occurred this would give a low 
technical score of 0. Participants in this study who scored 0-3 where classified as non-
technical while participants who scored 4-5 as technical.  The questions were: 
 
If your personal devices e.g. mobile telephone or computer were taken away from you 
tomorrow, would it bother you? 
Do you think that we rely too much on technology?                  
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Do you enjoy exploring the possibilities of new technology?   
Do you think technologies create more problems than they solve?    
Is Internet access important to you?        
Do you like to use innovative technology as opposed to tried and tested technology? 
 
Procedure 
On recruitment all participants received an information sheet that explained the study and 
the concept of AmI technologies. Participants were invited to attend Northumbria 
University, UK to take part in a group session. The groups were ran at various times and 
days over a three-month period. Participants were told they would be asked to watch four 
short videotaped scenarios showing people using AmI systems and contribute to informal 
discussions on privacy and trust permissions for this type of technology. They were told 
all of the other participants in their particular group would be of approximately the same 
age and gender and informed the discussion groups would be recorded for further 
analysis. Participants were not informed about the technical/non-technical or the level of 
educational achievement classification that was used. An informal interview guide was 
used to help the moderator if the discussion deviated from the proposed topic.   
At the beginning of each group session the moderator gave an explanation and 
description of AmI technologies. After the initial introduction the first videotaped 
scenario was shown. Immediately after this each group was asked if they thought there 
were any issues or problems they could envisage if they were using that system. The 
same procedure was used for the other three-videotaped scenarios. The scenarios were 
viewed by all groups in the same order: e-voting, shopping, health and finance.  Once all 
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the videos had been viewed an overall discussion took place related to any 
advantage/disadvantages, issues or problems participants considered relevant to 
information exchange in an ambient society. Participant’s attitudes in general towards 
AmI systems were also noted. 
The moderator structured the discussions using an adaptation of the four-paned Johari 
Windows’s methodology (Luft, 1969) where the four panes represent (i) information 
shared by the self and others, (ii) information available to the self but closed to others, 
(iii) information known by others but unknown to the self and (iv) information as yet 
unknown by self and others. Each window contracts or expands dependent upon the 
amount of information an individual wants to disclose. Briggs (2004) has described a 
means whereby the windows can be used to represent personal disclosure preferences for 
different agent technologies, organisations or individuals.  
 
The duration of the sessions was approximately ninety minutes.  
ANALYSIS 
All group discussions were transcribed then read; a sentence-by-sentence analysis was 
employed. The data was then open coded using qualitative techniques and several 
categories were identified. The data was physically grouped into categories using 
sentences and phrases from the transcripts. Categories were then grouped into the 
different concepts, themes and ideas that emerged during the analysis.  
The various themes and concepts that emerged from the analysis provided greater insight 
into the issues regarding information exchange in an ambient society. Different issues 
related to the user, device and stakeholder emerged.  Further in-depth analysis revealed 
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several constructs related to risk, privacy, trust and social issues. These constructs were 
compared in relation to the user, device and stakeholder. These constructs are depicted in 
Table 1 (an x is used to depict whether the construct is associated with the user, device 
and/or stakeholder).  
In the following section each concept related to trust, risk, privacy and social issues are 
further explained. 
     Trust concepts 
a) Personalisation: the ability of people to personalise an AmI device, use personalised 
security mechanisms such as biometric verification systems e.g. fingerprints and the 
provision of personalised services from the stakeholder. Also the system and 
stakeholder’s sensitivity regarding sending and receiving personalised information in a 
timely manner. 
Participants agreed the benefits to some in society having systems that could exchange 
personal information when appropriate was advantageous. For example, people with 
medical problems or various disabilities having their health information being disclosed 
to the relevant people when needed.  
Discussion revealed participants concerns over systems being truly sensitive to 
circumstances under which personal information could legitimately be exchanged. For 
example, if someone was injured should the device have permission to inform their next 
of kin that he or she had been taken to hospital?  The transfer of sensitive personal 
information was discussed.  Leakage of sensitive information in inappropriate 
circumstances was seen as very problematic: 
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‘What if one of your agents gets corrupted and starts sending messages here, there and 
everywhere?’ 
 
b) Source credibility: linked to motivation and the credibility of the stakeholder 
Participants raised concerns over supermarkets using AmI systems to pressure people in 
buying goods. Concerns were raised over companies have the capacity to create user 
profiles and monitor people with regard to their shopping habits. This in turn would 
create health or lifestyle profiles accessible by third parties which would lead to untold 
consequences. 
Participants queried how they could trust ‘agent’ systems as they perceived they would 
be linked in some way to different stakeholders.  For example, if an agent was used to 
find information out about a personal loan, would they only return information from 
company A and B?  The issue of trust transfer (from a trusted to an unknown third party) 
may be threatening. 
 
c) Expertise: the ability level of the user. 
Participants discussed problems associated with the user’s level of expertise and the 
complexity of setting preferences for information exchange.  In other words, users with 
little confidence in their own ability to set privacy preferences may find it difficult to 
place their trust in agent systems. 
 
d) Predictability: the predictability of interaction. 
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Discussions highlighted the dynamic nature of human interaction and that we are not 
predictable robotic entities. Participants agreed human behaviour is complex and the 
amount of information related to our everyday lives was too immense to programme 
preferences into AmI systems. Participants commented that we act and react in different 
ways depending upon with whom we are interacting, when and where.  Setting up 
privacy preferences and permissions may become too time-consuming, reducing the 
utility of such systems.  Participants expressed concern about the level of control 
stakeholders would have and questioned whether they could trust stakeholders to always 
act in a predictable way. 
  
‘The kind of ordered, regular lifestyle that you’d have to live for it.  I don’t know what 
I’m going to be doing next week.  I really don’t.’ 
 
‘I mean if you know in your own mind what to program into this agent your average day 
you still haven’t had anything taken into consideration about your non-average day, 
anything could happen out of the blue and the machine will be all to pot because it 
doesn’t fit with what you’ve programmed into it’. 
 
Risk Concepts 
a) Reliance and responsibility: the user relying too much on the device to exchange 
information and the responsibility associated with this. 
Participants discussed relying on either the system and/or themselves would be 
problematic. Concern arose over trust in the information received. For example in the 
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shopping scenario the user was informed of allergy content in food, participants 
discussed who would be liable if this information was wrong especially if they were 
buying food for another person.  
 
‘Now if I’m relying on a gadget like that in the store to say this is safe for somebody on a 
gluten free diet and it’s not, what happens, who is liable then, me or the gadget?’ 
 
Discussion highlighted human fallibility in keeping the system up to date or losing the 
device (whilst acknowledging the fact that a truly AmI environment may or may not have 
this problem, we venture to suggest that the loss of something that gives us our identity 
bears similarities to this concern). Also, if the machine malfunctioned and the user was 
unaware of this what would the consequences be? Participants commented systems could 
not be truly aware of certain facts or always in control. They agreed AmI systems reduce 
cognitive load but questioned whether this was advantageous to humans in the long term.  
 
‘I want to rely on myself and a network of human beings, not a network of 
communications and little chips’. 
 
‘One is that there has to be a human input somewhere into the system and the reliability 
of the human input is dependent on the adaptability of that human being.  I think we are 
all intelligent human beings, we’re older, we’re wiser than we were some years ago and I 
think we could all put in intelligent information but we can all make mistakes and that is 
a failing that we have to recognise.’ 
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 Privacy constructs 
a) Physical: how physically accessible a person is to others  
Participants commented that AmI devices would break down the boundaries of physical 
privacy – making an individual accessible anywhere, anytime. They discussed issues 
related to leakage of personal information in public settings and especially during 
interpersonal interaction. Participants queried whether AmI devices could truly be 
context aware and deliver the correct information in a timely and appropriate fashion.  
 
‘ …you have no privacy, people know where you are, what you are eating, what you are 
doing, and that really bothers me.’ 
 
b) Informational: a person’s right to reveal personal information to others. 
The concept of informational privacy was a major concern for all participants. 
Participant’s highlighted complex patterns of personal information would be required to 
be able to control who receives what and when. Global companies and networks were 
seen as very problematic – facilitating the transmission of personal information across 
boundaries each with different rules and regulations.  
 
‘Databases can be offshore thereby there are sort of international waters and they are 




Participants acknowledged companies already hold information about you that you are 
unaware of and this should be made more transparent. Concerns were raised over the 
probability that stakeholders would collect personal information in an ad hoc manner 
without informing the person. Data gathering and data mining by stakeholders would 
create profiles about a person that would contain false information. Participants believed 
profiling would lead to untold consequence. For example, a person might be refused 
health insurance as their profile suggests he or she purchases unhealthy food.   
 
‘It’s (information) where it can lead. That’s the key to a lot of personal information about 
you, it’s telling you where you live, they (3rd parties) can get details from there and 
there’s companies buying and selling that information’. 
 
‘The device will say ‘ are you sure you want to eat so much red meat because we are 
going to elevate your insurance premium because of your unhealthy lifestyle’. 
 
c) Social: the ability to control social interactions between social actors. 
Participants discussed the possibility that AmI would foster social isolation. Although 
systems would in fact increase social privacy as less human-human interaction would 
take place, this was considered very problematic with enormous negative consequences. 
Participants commented in our social world we already leak information to others in the 
form of visual cues e.g. items in your shopping trolley, without any serious implications. 
In the physical world strangers knowing certain information about you is not problematic, 
however people do not want to share the same information with friends. In the physical 
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world interactions are considered ‘open’ where people can see exactly what is happening 
compared to the closed nature of the virtual world. One participant described this with 
reference to a tin opener. 
 
‘You know if you are using a tin opener, you think oh, I see, but with a computer you 
can’t do anything like that.  I mean with a vacuum cleaner you’ve got a fair idea of what 
to look for if the thing goes wrong but with a computer.  They put computers on the 
market and they are supposed to be trouble free because they thought they were such a 
good idea, but if they had waited to iron out all the troubles, it would be another fifty 
years.  You know look at the progress we have made.’ 
 
d) Psychological: a person’s right to decide with whom they share personal information. 
Psychological privacy emerged as a key barrier to AmI adoption and use. Participants 
agreed the type of information shared normally depends on who, what, where and why, 
but crucially is informed by the type of relationship they have with the other person. If 
their relationship is close e.g. family then the majority of information is shared quite 
freely. However, sharing even with a close family member depends on situation and 
context. Participants discussed concern over stakeholders sharing personal information 
with third parties and suggested AmI systems needed transparency at times.  
 
‘I don’t know who has got what information.  If I asked anyone are they going to tell me 
if they didn’t want to and how would I know that they were telling me?  So it goes into 
this kind of vacuum, but they are only going to tell me the information they want me to 
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know and they miss the bit that they really don’t want me to know, that they do know or 
not know, I have no way of finding out.’ 
 
Complex preferences would have to be set for AmI systems and these would need to 
change dynamically. Participants commented, in some circumstances, relying on agent 
systems and the use of preset preferences for sharing information was socially 
unacceptable. This related to how we as humans are not predictable and interact with 
other in a dynamic way. 
 
‘One of the main issues is you have got all of these different types of information and how 
do people actually set the permissions so only person A gets that information and person 
B gets that and as humans we are continually changing and interacting with more and 
more people or less people and so the permissions change.’ 
 
e) Choice: the right to choose 
Participants commented little or even no choice would exist in an AmI society. 
Comments suggested ‘forced choice’ would become the ‘norm.’ Participants expressed 
concern over the right not to reveal information having vast implications leading to 
exclusion in some circumstances.  A sense of being damned simply because one might 
choose not to share certain types of information. 
 
f) Control: the right to control 
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Participants were concerned about reliance on AmI systems reducing personal control. 
Discussions revealed AmI systems would create ‘Big Brother’ societies that lacked 
control and choice. Concern was raised over how information would be controlled by 
stakeholders, i.e. receiving information that is considered appropriate.  
 
‘What I don’t like is where it starts taking control of that information from your hands 
and having information in an electronic device which fair enough you are supposed to 
have programmed in the first place but once you have programmed it what’s your control 
over it then and it’s transmitting information about you to all these various.  I don’t trust 
technology enough yet.’ 
 
‘That is (AmI system) structuring your life for you.  You think you’re in control but you’re 
not.’   
 
g) Security: security aspects related to transmission and storage of information. 
Security of AmI systems emerged as key factor that would limit adoption and use. 
Hacking, access by third parties, leakage and storage were all areas discussed. 
Participants differed on the concept of using biometric systems for verification and 
authentication purposes. Participants classed as technical were more aware of problems 
related to biometric devices than those from a non-technical background. Most agreed 
biometric systems could alleviate the problems of human error (such as forgetting PINs); 
however concerns were raised with regard to exclusion when using biometric systems, 
e.g. the ability of the elderly to enrol and use such systems.  
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 Social issues 
a) Exclusion 
Participants commented that exclusion would be a major problem with adoption and use 
of AmI systems. People would be excluded by age, ability, disability and membership of 
specific populations, e.g. business communities. 
 
b) Social and moral values 
Participants discussed several social and moral issues related to AmI systems. They 
suggested technologies are now undermining human responsibility. Participants agreed 
we now interact less socially with others. AmI systems could further decrease social 
interaction, reduce our social skills and take away the concept of inter-personal trust.  
 
‘We are so anti-social anyway, unless Andrew has his friends to the house and I must 
admit I mean I communicate with a lot of my friends now by text messages whereas 
before you would have called to them or you know send an email but I see less of people 
that I care about because it’s more convenient to send them a text or an email and I hate 
it, I really do hate it and I think that’s going to encourage more because then you’re not 
even going to have to make the effort to send the text message, your machine is going to 
be sending them a text message because you’re overdue writing to them.’ 
 
Although some participants in this study liked the idea of using biometric systems to 
access information and considered this a secure way, other participants viewed this as 
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‘depersonalising’ the task at hand. Discussion highlighted how life in general is 
becoming more depersonalised through increased interaction with technology and less 
with other human beings. Participants discussed issues related to the fact that if AmI 
systems were truly ‘context aware’ this depersonalises human interaction and thought 
processes. 
 
‘If he had of collapsed (referring to hospital scenario) and it wasn’t just a, say it was a 
brain tumour and he only had a few days to live when they got him into hospital and his 
family were informed of this via an electronic device I just think that’s terrible, it’s like 
totally depersonalising like the medical way of things and I mean I certainly wouldn’t like 
be told by somebody that one of my relatives was going to die or something over a little 
piece of metal or plastic or whatever it is so I think it’s one of those things in theory it all 
sounds well and good but in reality it just wouldn’t work. 
 
Concerns were raised over the fact existing technologies are often intrusive. Some 
participants commented that when we disclose information to others we often do not 
reveal the truth for various reasons. They contemplated what the consequence of this 
would be in an AmI world. For example, if a person told his or her partner they were 
shopping when in fact that was not true, would his or her partner be able to track the 






To evaluate the social impact of AmI use, trust and privacy issues need to be understood. 
The framework used in this study to evaluate trust and privacy has revealed different 
contexts, stakeholders, device type and actual users all need to be considered. This is 
important if we are to fully understand user interaction with AmI technologies.  
As discussed earlier in this chapter trust is not symmetrical, distributive, associative or (at 
least strongly) transitive. The findings from this research support this view. Both privacy 
and trust are multidimensional constructs with underlying factors that dynamically 
change according to context. The findings support the view of Sillence et al. (2004) in 
that trust is multidimensional.  
To establish trust and privacy the following questions need to be addressed when related 
to information exchange: Who is receiving it? Who has access? Is the receiver credible, 
and predictable? Where is the information being sent and received? Does the user have 
choice and control? How does the device know who to communicate with, e.g. through 
personalised agents? This raises interesting questions regarding permission setting within 
an AmI context – regarding the extent to which individuals should be allowed to make 
day to day decisions about who or what to trust on an ad hoc basis, or should employ 
agent technologies that represent their personal trust and privacy preferences and 
communicate these to other agents (Marsh,1994).   
Disclosure of information in any form or society is a two-way process. Findings support, 
the Fair Information Practice-FIP (e.g. Federal Trade Commission of America, 2000) that 
suggests companies should give users: notice, choice, access and security. We need to 
consider the following guidelines when considering adoption and use of AmI systems: 
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 a) Choice: the option to reveal or hide information 
b) Control: the ability to manage, organise and have power over all information 
exchanged and to notified of information held about you 
c) Transparency: the need for stakeholder’s to be open to information held about a 
person and for that person to have a right to access and change such information 
d) Global rules and regulations: a global infrastructure of rules related to information 
exchange 
e) Obscurity: the need for information exchange to be closed or made ambiguous 
dependent on the user’s needs and desires at anyone moment in time 
f) Trust and privacy preference: the need for the user to set preferences that can be 
dynamic, temporary and secure. 
 
These guidelines are basic and we need to consider the fact humans are inherently social 
beings and their actions are always directly or indirectly linked to other people. Findings 
from this evaluation raise some interesting issues related to human values: Will people 
begin to rely to heavily on AmI technology? Will people be comfortable exchanging all 
types of information even when of a very personal nature? Will the way we socially 
interact change, and social norms along with it? Will our society become one where 
people feel more at home interacting with their fridge instead of other people? Will AmI 
technology blur the boundaries between home and workplace making society one of 
efficiency and productivity taking over from love and leisure time?  
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AmI systems do bring substantial benefits, including less time pressure, no queuing for 
goods, and memory enhancements. However the disadvantages in our social world might 
be far greater, e.g. less social interaction, reliance on machines, less privacy, and the 
potential erosion of trust. Distrust and suspicion of AmI systems appear key concepts that 
emerged from the group discussions in this study, and bear much further examination and 
understanding.  
This book is dedicated to the concept of trust. However, if we begin to rely on systems to 
make decisions on our behalf by setting prior preferences do we actually need to 
understand the concepts of privacy and trust? For AmI systems to work societies need to 
be at least somewhat transparent. To be truly transparent then we need complete trust and 
have no concern over privacy. The enigmatic nature of trust, privacy and social values 
questions whether we can really understand this type of puzzle or even create a clear 
vision for future interactions with AmI systems. 
 
Future directions 
Ambient intelligence is now an area intensely researched and undergoing rapid 
development already visible in advanced mobile, PDA and notebook services. The vision 
of a future filled with smart and interacting everyday objects offers a whole range of 
possibilities. To some the scenarios described in this chapter might appear somewhat 
‘unrealistic’. However if Weiser’s vision is to be realised then we must acknowledge the 
advantages and disadvantages this transformation will have on society. For example, 
sensor and communication mechanisms in the environment will help people with 
disabilities lead a more independent life. We will be able to track everything from 
 52
children, family, and friends to missing keys. However we must question whether the 
transformation that will take place is ethical or even socially acceptable. Do we want or 
need to rely on embedded devices seamless exchanging information on our behalf? 
Clear methodologies that allow in-depth investigation into how information exchange in 
an ambient world can be made trustworthy, secure and private are needed. This requires 
cross-disciplinary approaches where evaluation is based on both the technical and social 
aspects of such interactions. 
The next stage in the research reported in this chapter is to develop a survey developed 
from the project findings. The survey will be a useful tool in measuring concepts related 
to trust, privacy and social issues when considering ambient devices and information 
exchange. The findings will give further insight into how ambient devices can be 




Abdul-Rahman, A. (2004). A Framework for Decentralised Trust Reasoning. PhD 
Thesis, University of London. 
Ahas, R., & Mark, Ü. (2005). Location based services - new challenges for planning and  
public administration? Futures  37(6): 547-561 
Altman, I. (1975). The Environment and Social Behavior. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Altman, I. & Chemers, M. (1989). Culture and Environment. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 53
Arndt, C. (2005). The loss of privacy and identity  
Biometric Technology Today, Volume 13, Issue 8, Pages 6-7  
Beslay, L. & Punie, Y. (2002). The virtual residence: Identity, privacy and security.  
IPTS Report 67, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. Special Issue 
on Identity and Privacy.  
Bies, R. J. (2001). Interactional (in) justice: The sacred and the profane. In J. Greenberg 
& R. Cropanzano (Eds.), Advances in organisational justice. (pp 89-118). 
Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 
Bohn, J., Coroama, V., Langheinrich, M., Mattern, F, & Rohs, M. (2005). Social, 
Economic, and Ethical Implications of Ambient Intelligence and Ubiquitous 
Computing. In Weber, W., Rabaey, J. & Aarts, E. Ambient Intelligence. Berlin: 
Springer. 
Bødker, M. (2004). Trust and the digital environment. Downloaded March 2006 
http://www.itu.dk/people/boedker/trustpaper.pdf
Bok, S. (1978). Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York: Pantheon 
Books. 
Boon, S. D. & Holmes, J. (1991). The dynamics of interpersonal trust: Resolving 
uncertainty in the face of risk. Pp190-211 of Hinde, R. A. & Groebel, J. (Eds), 
Cooperation and Prosocial Behaviour. Cambridge University Press. 
Bickmore T. & Cassell, J. (2001). Relational Agents; A Model and Implementation of 
Building User Trust. Proceedings CHI 2001, pp396-403. 
Brandies, L.D. & Warren, S. (1890). The right to privacy: the implicit made explicit. 
Harvard Law Review, 4, 193-220 
 54
Brien, A. (1998). Professional ethics and the culture of trust. Journal of Business Ethics 
17 (4) 391-409. 
Briggs, P. (2004). Key issues in the elicitation of disclosure preferences fro ambient 
intelligence – a view from a window. Paper presented at Considering Trust in 
Ambient Societies workshop, CHI 2004, Vienna, Austria. 
Brin, D. (1998). The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between 
Privacy and Freedom. England: Perseus Press 
Boni, M., & Prigmore, M. (2002). Cultural Aspects of Internet Privacy, Proceedings of 
the UKAIS 2002 Conference, Leeds, UK  
Burgoon, J.K. (1982). Privacy & Communication. Communication yearbook. 6. 206-249. 
Chan, Y. (2000). Privacy in the family: Its hierarchical and asymmetric nature. Journal of 
Comparative Family Studies, 31 (1). 1-23. 
Chang, E., Thomson, P., Dillon, T. & Hussain, F. (2004). The Fuzzy and Dynamic 
Nature of Trust, pp 161-174 of  Katsikas, S., López, J. & Perum, G. (Eds): 
TrustBus 2005. LNCS 3592. Berlin: Springer. 
Cheskin Research & Studio Archetype/Sapient. (1999). eCommerce Trust Study. 
http://www.cheskin.com/think/studies/ecomtrust.html;  
Cheskin Research. (2000). Trust in the Wired 
Americas.http://www.cheskin.com/p/ar.asp?mlid=7&arid=12&art=0 
Clarke, R. (1999). Introduction to Dataveillance and Information privacy, and Definitions 
of terms. http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Intro.html 
Downloaded January 2004  
 55
Consolvo, S., Smith, I.E. Matthews, T., LaMarca, A., Tabert, J., & Powledge, P. (2005). 
Location disclosure to social relations: why, when, & what people want to 
share, Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing 
systems, April ,Portland, Oregon, USA  
Corritore, C. L., Kracher, B. & Wiedenbeck, S. (2003). Online trust: concepts, evolving 
themes, a model. International Journal of Human Computer Studies 58:737-
758. 
Cramer, L. (2002). Web privacy with P3P. USA: O’Reilly & Associates 
Cranor, L.F., Reagle, J., & Ackerman, M.S. (1999). Beyond concern: understanding net 
users’ attitudes about online privacy.  In I. Vogelsang & B. Compaine (Eds.), 
The Internet Upheaval: Raising Questions, Seeking Answers in Communications 
Policy. USA: MIT Press. pp 47-60. 
Dawson, L., Minocha, S., & Petre, M. (2003). Social and Cultural Obstacles to the (B2C) 
E-Commerce Experience. Paper presented at the People and Computers  
   XVII - Designing for Society, 225-241 
Dibben, M. R. (2000). Exploring Interpersonal Trust in the Entrepreneurial Venture. 
Hampshire: MacMillan Press. 
Dritsas, S., Gritzalis, D., & Lambrinoudakis, C. (2005). Protecting privacy and 
anonymity in pervasive computing trends and perspectives. Telematics and 
Information. In Press 
Egger, F.N. (2003). From Interactions to Transactions: Designing the Trust Experience 
for Business-to-Consumer Electronic Commerce. PhD Thesis, Eindhoven 
University of Technology (The Netherlands).  
 56
Egger, F N. (2000). Trust Me, I’m an Online Vendor. Pp101-102 of CHI 2001 
Proceedings Extended Abstracts. 
Falcone, R. & Castelfranchi, C. (2001). The Socio-Cognitive Dynamics of Trust; Does 
Trust Create Trust?, in Falcone, R., Singh, M. & Tan, Y-H. (Eds): Trust in 
Cyber-Societies. LNAI 2246, pp55-72. Berlin: Springer. 
Fiske, A.P., Kitayama, S., Markus, H.R., & Nisbett, R.E. (1998). The cultural matrix of 
social psychology. In D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.). The 
handbook of Social Psychology, 4th Edition, Vol.2. Boston: McGraw-Hill. (pp. 
915-981). 
Friedman, B., Kahn, P. H., & Howe, D. C. (2000). Trust Online. Communications of the 
ACM43 (12):34-40. December. 
FTC Study (2000) Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic 
Marketplace. A Report to Congress May. 
Fukuyama, F. (1996). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New 
York: Free Press. 
Fung R. K. K., & Lee, M. K. O. (1999).  EC-Trust (Trust in Electronic Commerce): 
Exploring the Antecedent Factors. Pp517-519 of Proceedings of the American 
Conference on Information Systems. 
Good, D. (2000). Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust. in Gambetta, D. (ed.) 
Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, electronic edition, 
Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, chapter 3 pp31-48. 
http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/good31-48.pdf 
 57
Gambetta, D. (2000). Can we Trust Trust, in Gambetta, D. (ed.) Trust: Making and 
Breaking Cooperative Relations, electronic edition, Department of Sociology, 
University of Oxford, chapter 13, pp213-237. 
http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/gambetta213-237.pdf 
Gotlieb, C.C. (1996). Privacy: A concept whose time has come and gone. In D. Lyon and 
E. Zureik (Eds.), Computers, Surveillance and Privacy. USA: University of 
Minnesota Press. pp 156-171. 
Jackson, L., von Eye, A., Barbatsis, G., Biocca, F., Zhao, Y., & Fitzgerald, H.E. (2003). 
Internet Attitudes and Internet Use: some surprising findings from the 
HomeNetToo project. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 59.  
Jarvenpaa, S., Tractinsky, N., & Saarinen, L.(1999). Consumer Trust in an Internet Stroe: 
A Cross-Cultural Validation. Journal of Computer Mediated Communication 
5(2):December. http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol5/issue2/jarvenpaa.html
Jessup L., & Robey D. (2002) The Relevance of Social Issues in Ubiquitous Computing 
Environments. Communications of the ACM 45(12). 88-91.  
Karvonen, K.(1999). Creating Trust. In Proceedings of the 4th Nordic Workshop on 
Secure IT Systems (NordSec 99). November 1-2, 1999, Kista, Sweden. 
Kaya, N., & Weber, M.J. (2003). Cross-cultural differences in the perception of crowing 
and privacy regulation: American and Turkish students. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology. 32. 301-309 
Kozlov, S. (2004). Achieving Privacy in Hyper-Blogging Communities: privacy 
management for Ambient Technologies. 
 58
http://www.sics.se/privacy/wholes2004/papers/kozlov.pdf Downloaded June 
2004 
Lester, T. (2001). The Reinvention of Privacy. The Atlantic online. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/03/lester-pt.htm Downloaded 
September 2001 
Lewis, J. D., & Weigert, A. (1985). Trust as a Social Reality. Social Forces 63(4):967-
985. June. 
Little, L., Briggs, P., & Coventry, L. (2005). Public Space Systems: Designing for 
privacy? International Journal of Human Computer Studies.63, 254-268 
Little, L., Briggs, P., & Coventry, L. (2004). Videotaped Activity Scenarios and the 
Elicitation of Social Rules for Public Interactions. BHCIG Conference, Leeds, 
September 2004 
Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and Power. Chichester: Wiley. 
Luhmann, N. (2000). Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in 
Gambetta, D. (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, 
electronic edition, Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, chapter 6, 
pp94-107. http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/luhmann94-107.pdf 
Luft, J. (1969). Of Human Interaction.  Palo Alto, CA:National Press 
Margulis, S.T. (2003). On the Status and Contribution of Westin’s and Altman’s Theories 
of Privacy. Journal of Social issues, 59 (2). 411-429. 
Marsh, S. (1994). Formalising Trust as a Computational Concept. PhD Thesis, 
University of Stirling, Scotland. Available online via www.stephenmarsh.ca 
 59
Marsh, S. (2005). Artificial Trust, Regret, Forgiveness, and Boing. Seminar given at 
University of St Andrews, Scotland, 4th October, 2005. Available online via 
www.stephenmarsh.ca 
Marsh, S., & Dibben, M. R. (2003). The Role of Trust in Information Science and 
Technology, in Cronin, B. (Ed.), Annual Review of Information Science and 
Technology, 37 (2003): 465-498. 
McCandlish, S. (2002). EFF’s Top 12 ways to Protect Your Online Privacy. Electronic 
Frontier Technology. http://www.eff.org/Privacy/eff_privacy_top_12.html 
Downloaded January 2004
Metzger, M. J. (2004). Exploring the barriers to electronic commerce: Privacy, trust, and 
disclosure online. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 9(4) 
Misztal, B. (1996). Trust in Modern Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Moor, J.H. (1997) Towards a Theory of Privacy in the Information Age. Computers and 
Society, 27, 3, 27-32.  
Nguyen, D.H.,& Truong, K.N. (2003). PHEmail: Designing a Privacy Honoring Email 
System. Proceedings of CHI 2003 Extended Abstracts, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida,  
Nijholt, A. Rist, T., & Tuinenbrejier, K. (2004). Lost in ambient intelligence? In: Proc. 
ACM Conference on Computer Human Interaction (CHI 2004), Vienna, 
Austria. 
Olsen, K., Grudin, J., Horvitz, E. (2005) ‘A study of preferences for sharing and  
privacy’. CHI, 2005 extended abstracts on Human factors in computing systems 
Palen, L., & Dourish, P. (2003). Unpacking Privacy for a Networked World. Proceedings 
of the ACM, CHI 2003,5 (1), 129- 135. 
 60
Patrick, A., Briggs, P. & Marsh, S. (2005). Designing Systems that People Will Trust, in 
Cranor, L. F. & Garfinkel, S., Security and Usability: Designing Secure Systems 
that People Can Use. O’Reilly. 
Pedersen, D.M. (1999). Model for types of privacy by privacy functions. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 19. 397-405. 
Pedersen, D.M. (1997). Psychological functions of privacy. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 17. 147-156. 
Pedersen, D.M. (1979). Dimensions of privacy. Perceptual and Motor skills, 48. 1291-
1297.    
Perry, M. O’Hara, K. Sellen., Brown. & Harper, R. (2001). Dealing with Mobility: 
Understanding Access Anytime, Anywhere. ACM Transactions on Computer-
Human Interaction, 8, (4). 323-347. 
Price, B. A., Adam, K., & Nuseibeh, B. (2005). Keeping Ubiquitous Computing to 
Yourself: a practical model for user control of privacy. International Journal of 
Human-Computer Studies, Volume 63, Issues 1-2, Pages 228-253  
Punie, Y. (2003). A social and technological view of Ambient Intelligence in Everyday 
Life: What bends the trend? Key deliverable, The European Media and 
Technology in Everyday Life Network (EMTEL).  
Riegelsberger, J. & Sasse, M. A. (2001). Trustbuilders and Trustbusters. pp 17-70 of 
Towards the E-Society: Proceedings of the First IFIP Conference on E-
Commerce, E-Society, and E-Government. London: Kluwer. 
 61
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S. & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so Different After 
All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust. Academy of Management Review. 
23(3):393-404. 
Siau, K.& Shen, Z. (2003). Building Consumer Trust in Mobile Commerce. 
Communications of the ACM 46(4):91-94. April. 
Sillence, E., Briggs, P., Fishwick, L. & Harris, P. (2004). Trust and Mistrust of Online 
Health Sites. Proceedings of CHI'2004, April 24-29 2004,Vienna Austria, p663-
670. ACM press 
Shneiderman, B. (2000). Designing Trust Into Online Experiences, in Communications of 
the ACM, December 4.12  
Streitz, N., & Nixon, P. (2005). The disappearing computer. Communication of the ACM, 
48, 3, 32-35 
Sztompka, F. (1999). Trust: A Sociological Theory. Cambridge University Press. 
Thibaut, J. W. and Kelley, H. H. (1959) The social Psychology of Groups, New York: 
Wiley 
Viljanen, L. (2005). Towards an Ontology of Trust. pp 175-194 of Katsikas, S., López, J. 
& Perum, G. (Eds): TrustBus 2005. LNCS 3592. Berlin: Springer. 
Weiser, M. (1991). The Computer for the 21st Century. Scientific American 265(3):66-
75. September. 





Table 1: Privacy, trust and social issues related to AmI use 
 Information 
 Device User Stakeholder 
Trust:     
personalisation x x x 
expertise  x  
predictability  x x 
source  x x 
    
Risk:    
reliance and 
responsibility 
x x x 
    
Privacy:     
physical  x  
informational x x x 
psychological  x x 
social  x x 
choice  x  
control  x  
security x x x 
    
Social issues:    
exclusion  x  
social and 
moral values 
 x x 
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